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CAN FEDERAL COURTS REMAIN OPEN WHEN
STATE COURTS ARE CLOSED?:
ERIE R. CO. v. TOMPKINS
ON THE INDIAN RESERVATION
PETER B. KUTNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers whether a federal court can, in the exer-
cise of its diversity jurisdiction,1 entertain a civil action over which
the courts of its state lack jurisdiction becuase it arose within an In-
dian reservation and the defendant is an American Indian. It is
prompted by the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
in Poitra v. Demarrias,2 where the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on this question had created,
or at least aggravated, a conflict among the circuits.3
II. POITRA V. DEMARRIAS
Poitra v. Demarrias arose from an automobile accident on the
Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation in North Dakota. An auto-
mobile driven by Demarrias collided with another automobile, fatally
injuring a passenger in the latter. The victim's mother brought an ac-
tion against Demarrias in the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota, claiming damages for wrongful death un-
der North Dakota law.4 Jurisdiction was predicated on the amount
in controversy and diversity of citizenship, the plaintiff being an en-
rolled Indian residing on the portion of the Standing Rock Reserva-
tion located in North Dakota and the defendant being an enrolled
Indian residing on the portion of the reservation located in South
Dakota. Counsel for the North Dakota Unsatisfied Judgment Fund,
appearing on behalf of the defendant, conceded that the jurisdictional
facts pleaded by the defendant satisfied the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1970),, but moved to dimiss the action, contend-
* A.B. 1969, Cornell; J.D. 1972, Harvard. Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Oklahoma. Member of the Colorado, Bar.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
2. 369 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.D. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 23 (Sth Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 934 (1975).
8. See notes 40-49 infra and accompanying text.
4. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-21 (1960).
5. All persons born within the United States to a member of an Indian tribef are natural-
born citizens of the United States. Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253 ; Nationality Act of October 14, 1940, ch. 876, tit. I, ch. 2, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1138,
repealed by the McCarran-Walter Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, title IV, § 403(a) (42),
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ing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action
because the state courts of North Dakota lacked jurisdiction over
the action.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota had resolved the question
of state jurisdiction in Gourneau v. Smith,6 which, like Poitra, was
an action between two Indians arising from an automobile acci-
dent on their reservation. That court's decision rested on two sta-
tutes, one state and one federal, providing for the assumption of juris-
diction by the state, with the consent of the inhabitants of an Indian
reservation, over civil actions arising within the reservation to which
Indians are parties. 7 In an earlier case,8 the state statute had
been held to have the effect of "completely disclaim[ing] State
jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on an Indian reserva-
tion unless the Indians themselves have acted to accept jurisdiction
in the manner provided by the statute." 9 The federal statute, en-
acted as § 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,10 provides:
The con'sent of the United States is hereby given to any State
not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between
Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume,
with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian
country or part thereof which would be affected by such as-
sumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all such
civil causes of action arising within such Indian country or any
part thereof as may be determined by such State to the ,same
extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes
of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of gen-
eral application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country or
part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State."
66 Stat. 280; McCarren-Walter Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, tit. ITT, ch. 1, § 301 (a) (2),
66 Stat. 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1970). As a result, a tribal Indian Is now regarded,
for purposes of diversity Jurisdiction as a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled.
Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966) Deere
v. State of New York, 22 F.2d 851 (N.D.N.Y. 1927), afj'd sub nora. Deere v. St. Lawrence
River Power Co., 32 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1929); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, 156, 372 (1942); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
cEDURE § 3622 (1975). But see 24 Mo. L. REV. 562, 567 (1959).
6. 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974); 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970). N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-19-02 (1974) and 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970) specify the manner in which consent to juris-
diction may be given. The procedure specified in 25 U.S.C. § 1326 must be followed if con-
sent is to be effective. Rennerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Mon-
tana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). Therefore, a provision of the state "consent" statute for the
acceptance of state jurisdiction by individual Indians, N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974),
is invalid. Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). There is no indication in the
reports of Poitra v. Demarrias that the defendant had individually accepted state juris-
diction.
8. In re Whiteshleld, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963).
9. Id. at 698.
10. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, tit. IV, § 402, 82 Stat. 79, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a)
(1970).
11. Indian reservations, including state highways and other rights of way running
through them, are "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970); Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N.W.2d 256, 258 (N.D. 1973).
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In Gourneau,12 the state supreme court held that the enactment
of the two statutes deprived state courts of jurisdiction over actions
between Indians arising on a reservation when consent to state juris-
diction had not been given by the Indians. of that reservation.1 3 As
the Indians of the Standing Rock Reservation had not consented to
state jurisdiction,'14 state courts lacked jurisdiction over Mrs. Poi-
tra's wrongful death action.
In Poitra, the district court granted the defendant's motion to dis-
miss. Its brief memorandum decision stated that in its diversity juris-
diction, the court could not entertain an action not maintainable in a
state court. 15 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 6 was cited for this proposition.
Nor, according to a quotation from Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, 17 could a diversity court "afford recovery if the right to re-
cover is made unavailable by the State.""' The Supreme Court of
North Dakota having decided that an action of this nature was not
maintainable in a state court,' 9 the district court found itself to be
without subject-matter jurisdiction.
20
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the dis-
missal. 2' It believed that the Supreme Court's opinion in Hanna v.
v. Plumer2 2 had "established a subtle retreat from prior decisions,"
such as Guaranty Trust, Angel v. Bullington23 and Woods v. In-
terstate Realty Co., 24 which had led to an overconcern with con-
formity to state law in diversity actions." 2 5 Altlhough Erie required
federal courts to respect the "definition of state-created rights
and obligations by the state courts" where the -state rule of law is
"bound up" with those rights and obligations,'26 its "primary con-
12. 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
13. The court said that state courts would have been without jurisdiction even If the
plaintiff were not an Indian. Id. at 259. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals in Poitra v.
Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1974), construed 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970) as
"stat[ing], in effect, that until an Indian reservation consents to the jurisdiction of the
state courts, such Jurisdiction may not be assumed by the state courts of any cause of
acion Involving Indians and arising within the boundaries of the Indian reservation." The
plaintiff conceded, at least in the Supreme Court, that state courts lacked subject-matter
Jurisdiction over her action. Demarrias v. Poitra, 421 U.S. 934, 936 (1975) (White, J.,
dissenting). See Kennerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400
U.S. 423 (1971).
14. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1974).
15. 369 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D.N.D. 1973).
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
18. Id. at 108-09.
19. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
20. Poitra v. Demarrias, 369 F. Supp. 257, 258-59 (D.N.D. 1973). It would have been
more accurate to state that, rather than leaving the federal court without jurisdiction,
state law required the court to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon It by 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L.
REV. 1082, 1098 n.68 (1963).
21. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975).
22. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
23. "330 U.S. 183 (1947).
24. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
25. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 25 (8th Cir. 1974).
26. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958).
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cerns . . . were with providing equal protection to citizen-defen-
dants and with 'the necessary bridling of encroaching federalism in
areas of state policy.' "21 The court concluded that "in the absence
of identifiable state interests which are inextricably linked with the
underlying -substantive right," . . ., the interest of the federal court




This led the Court of Appeals to search for state policies which
would be defeated by federal assumption of jurisdiction over the ac-
tion before it. It found none. Ignoring North Dakota's disclaimer of
state jurisdiction without Indian consent 29 during the period when
federall law permitted the state to assume jurisdiction unilaterally"0
the court found that "the state courts of North Dakota are open to
Indians. ... 11 State law32 created the substantive right which the
plaintiff asserted and prior to the enactment of the "consent" statutes
the state courts had assumed jurisdiction over actions substantially
identical to Poitra.33 "The reason that North Dakota lacks jurisdic-
tion over this civil action is because of the special status given
Indians under federal law, not because of any state policy considera-
tion."134 In an analysis of relevant federal policies, the court deter-
mined that the federal "con-sent" statute 35 was intended only to pre-
vent unilateral encraochment upon Indian self-government by the
states, not to deprive Indians of state-created substantive rights by
denying them access to federal courts. It thought, too, that the as-
sertion of federal jurisdiction in a case founded upon a state wrong-
ful death statute would not interfere with Indian self-government. 36
The Indians of the Standing Rock Reservation themselves had
adopted state laws as a "guide" in the determination of civil actions
in their tribal courts. 3T In the absence of "policy limitations requir-
ing the federal court to refuse adjudication .. .when its jurisdiction
is properly invoked" 3 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a), the district court
was required to entertain the action.
The Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certior-
ari.39 Justice White, dissenting, 40 would have granted certiorari be-
27. Poitra V. Demarrhas, 502 F.2d 23, 26 (8th Cir. 1974), quoting from Prashar v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 1973).
28. Poitra v. Demarrlas, 502 F.2d 23, 26 (8th Cir. 1974).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974) In re WVhiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963).
30. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 7, 67 Stat. 590, repealed by Civil Rights Act of
April 11, 1968, P.L. 90-284, tit. TV, § 403(b), 82 Stat. 79.
31. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1974).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-21 (1960).
33. See, e.g., Vermillon v. Spotted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957).
24. Poltra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1974).
85. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
36. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27-9 (8th Cir. 1974).
37. Code of Justice of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe § 2.1 (July 1973).
98. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 29 (Sth Cir. 1974).
89. Demarrias v. Poitra, 421 U.S. 934 (1975).
40. Id. at 934-37.
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cause he considered the Court of Appeals' decision to be "squarely
in conflict" with two decisions of the Ninth Circuit, Littell v. Nakai4'
and Hot Oill Service, Inc. v. Hall.42 These decisions had held that
when the courts of a state lack jurisdiction over a reservation-based
action by a non-Indian against an Indian, the federal district courts
of that state lack diversity jurisdiction over the action. In Poitra, the
Eighth Circuit had distinguished the Ninth Circuit decisions on the
ground that they rested on a federal policy of non-interference with
Indian self-government which was not apposite to Mrs. Poitra's wrong-
ful death action. 43 But the Ninth Circuit's consideration of interfer-
ence with. Indian self-government was necessary only to determine
whether state courts would have had jurisdiction over the actions.
Prior to the enactment of the federal "consent" statute,44 the Su-
preme Court's decision in Williams v. Lee 45 had established inter-
ference with Indian self-goverment in reservation affairs as the test
of whether state courts were precluded from exercising jurisdiction
over civil actions arising on reservations.4 Determining through
Williams that state courts lacked jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held,
by reference to Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 47 that there could be
no federal diversity jurisdiction where state courts lacked jurisdic-
tion.48 This the Eighth Circuit had declined to do, creating the con-
flict detected by Justice White.
49
If the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Poitra, it would
have been required to consider first whether Erie5 ° and its "pro-
geny,"5 1 particularly Angel v. Bullingto.n52 and Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 53 prevented the federal district court from entertaining
an action over which the courts of its state lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. If this question were resolved in the negative, the Court
would then have addressed itself to the policies underlying the ab-
sence of state jurisdiction in the instant case and the effect of the
federal "consent" statute54 in order to determine whether the dis-
41. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
42. 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
43. 502 F.2d 23, 28-9 (8th Cir. 1974).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
45. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Ironically, the unsuccessful plaintiff In Littell v. Nakai was
counsel for the successful defendants in iVlliams 1,. Lee.
46. Id. at 223; Organized Village of t ake v. Egan. 369 U.S. 60, 67-8 (1962).
47. 337 U.S. 535 (1919). See txt accompanying notes J59-70 infra.
48. Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 4S6 (9th Cir. 1965); Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366
F.2d 295 (9th Cir, 1966).
49. Deniarrias v. Poitra, 421 U.S. 934, 935-36 (1975) (White, J., dissenting). Decisions of
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits are also substantially in conflict with Littell v. Nakai and
Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hll on this point. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th
Cir. 1965); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 20S (6th Cir. 1974). See also Sun Sales Corp. v.
Block Land, Inc., 456 F.2d 857, 862-63 (3rd Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 201-
29 infra.
50. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
51. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949).
52. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
53. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
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trict court was required to dismiss the action.55 I intend to follow this
course. Alternatively, the Court could have repudiated Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co. This might be desirable and warranted by the
development of Erie jurisprudence during the past quarter century.56
I will assume, however, that the decision was correct on its facts and
remains good law to that extent.
III. THE ROLE OF THE "RULES OF DECISION ACT"
As Poitra v. Demarrias presented the issue of whether the law
prevailing in the North Dakota state courts prevails in a North Dako-
ta federal court adjudicating a diversity action, it is subject to "the
indiscriminate admixture of all questions respecting choices between
federal and state law in diversity cases, under the single rubric of
'the Erie doctrine' or 'the Erie problem.' "57 It is, however, debatable
whether Poitra posed an "Erie problem" at all. Erie R. Co. V. Tomp-
Kins is an application of the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, known as the
"Rules of Decision Act."", As slightly amended in 1948, it provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply. 9
In applying the Rules of Decision Act to Poitra, the threshold ques-
tion is whether jurisdiction is withheld from the North Dakota state
courts by the "laws of the several states." If so, one is led to consi-
der whether "the Constitution . . . or Acts of Congress otherwise re-
quire or provide" and whether a federal diversity action is a case
where the state law of jurisdiction does "apply." It should be noted
at the outset that the federal constitution and statutes do not "other-
wise require or provide." The congressional grant of jurisdiction
over diversity actions"0 simply authorizes federal courts to adjudi-
cate cases where diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount in
controversy are present. It does not command that all causes within
the provisions of the jurisdictional statute shall be heard on their
merits, regardless of state law."l A federal court can, consistent
55. See Demarrias v. Poitra, 421 U.S. 934, 935-37 (1975) (White, J., dissenting).
56. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-Examining Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.
and Reopening the Federal Courts, 48 N.C.L. REV. 56 (1969).
57. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Eric, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 697-98 (1974).
58. Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§1652 (1970).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
61. Meador, Stat6 Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1095 (1963),
arguing that the "abstention" doctrines developed by the Supreme Court have demonstrated
that a federal court having diversity jurisdiction is not required to exercise It. But see
Jackson, J., concurring in the result in First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air
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with the grant of jurisdiction, decline to entertain a cause of action
by applying the law of its state.
The North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Gourneau v. Smith 2
that state courts had no jurisdiction over actions between Indians
arising on a reservation rests on both state and federal law. The state
and federal "consent" statutes6 3 -each had the effect of withholding
jurisdiction from the state courts.6 4 As the state "consent" statute
preceded the federal -statute and "completely disclaim[ed] state
jurisdiction, ' 65 one is entitled to conclude that a law of "the several
states" operated to deprive state courts, and arguably federal courts,
of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the federal "consent" statute
may be taken to have occupied the field, displacing state laws on con-
sent to state civil jurisdiction over Indians. 6 If so, the appropriate
conclusion is that federal, not state, law was invoked in Poitra and the
case was outside the provisions of the Rules of Decision Act.
67
Identifying federal law as the source of the state courts' lack of
jurisdiction does not exclude Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins68 and its
progeny from bearing upon a federal court's power to entertain a di-
versity action. On the contrary, the policies developed under the um-
brella of the "Erie Doctrine"-particularly the policy of achieving
the same result in federal court as would have been reached in state
court69-do not hinge upon the source of the law in force in the state
courts. These policies have a force of their own, independent of the
Rules of Decision Act.7 0 In Littell v. Nakai71 and Hot Oil Service,
Inc. v. Hall,7 2 where federal law ailone withheld jurisdiction from
the Arizona state courts, the Court of Appeals held the federal courts
to be without jurisdiction because state courts were without juris-
Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 400 (1952), asserting that a state "door-closing" statute is not an
applicable "rule of decision" under the Rules of Decision Act because Congress "other-
Wise required and provided" in conferring diversity jurisdiction upon federal courts in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a).
62. 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973).
63. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974)'; 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
64. Goueneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973) (state and federal "consent"
statutes): In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1963) (state statute); Poitra v. De-
marrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (federal statute); Schantz
v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (federal statute).
65. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694, 69S (N.D. 1963).
66. See Kennerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400 U.S.
423 (1971). The absence of any reference to the state "consent" statute by the three
courts which considered Poitra v. Demarrias may reflect the view that it is a spent force.
The federal "consent" statute apparently supersedes the state statute's provision for con-
sent to state jurisdiction by individual Indians, N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974). Ro-
lette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 647 (N.D. 1974). But see the reference to de-
fendants' failure to sign individual consents in Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 68
(8th Cir. 1974), dcided on the same day by the same panel as Poitra v. Demarrias.
67. Both the district court and Court of Appeals stated that federal law precluded state
jurisdiction. 369 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D.N.D. 1973) ; 502 F.2d 23, 29 (8th Cir. 1974).
68. 304 U.S. 61 (1938).
69. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
70. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082, 1096 (1963).
71. 344 F.2d 486 (9t Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
72. 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
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diction. It cited Erie and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 7 3 as authority
and gave avoidance of a result different from the result of litigation
in state courts as the reason. 74 The Rules of Decision Act was never
mentioned. To inquire whether the source of the law prevailing in
state courts is state or federal begs the question. The question is
whether, given that a certain law (of whatever source) deprives
state courts of the power to adjudicate an action, Erie and its progeny
require that the result be the same when a federal court's diversity
jurisdiction is invoked.
For similar reasons, the determination of whether a state law
withholdilng jurisdiction from state courts was intended to apply to
federal courts does not control the application of that law to federal
courts, though it is an element to be considered. In Angel v. Bulling-
ington,75 the Court was unwilling to confine to state courts a statute
construed by the state supreme court as no more than a "limitation
of the jurisdiction -of the courts of this state. '" 7 6 "[The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court] spoke only of the jurisdiction of the State courts
because it was concerned only with the State courts."7 7  Simi-
larly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,7 8 the Court applied to federal
courts a state "door-closing ' '7 9 statute construed by a federal court
of appeals as "extend[ing] no further than the State courts."80
Limitations upon judicial jurisdiction may be the means by which a
state chooses to affect "substantive" law.8' If so, a federal court is
justified in applying to itself a law which by its terms or construction
is addressed only to the jurisdiction of state courts. The argument
that, by their very terms, state "door-closing" statutes are directed
toward state courts, so that federal diversity actions are not "cases
where they apply" under the Rules of Decision Act,8 2 is not disposi-
tive. The state policy implicated in a "door-closing" statute is an
important factor. The North Dakota "consent" statute83 is addressed
73. 397 U.S. 535 (1949).
74. Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965).
75. 930 U.S. 183 (1947).
76. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941).
77. Angel v. Bulllngton, 330 U.S. 183, 191 (1947).
78. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
79. The state laws to which the Supreme Court required federal courts to conform In
Angel v. Bullington and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. are known as "door-closing"
laws because they close the doors of state courts to a plaintiff without any inquiry Into
the merits of his claim. As they do not go to the existence or validity of a cause of ac-
tion, a litigant with a good cause of action enforceable elsewhere is blocked at the
threshold. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1092
(1963). The law prevailing in North Dakota state courts under Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973) fits this description.
80. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S.
635 (1949). In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has refused to apply
a state statute "intended, to prevent resort to the federal jurisdiction." Markham v. City
of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 713 (4th Cir. 1961).
81. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1096 (1963).
82. Mentioned and described as "simply the substance-procedure formula stated somewhat
differently. Id. at 1095-96.
83. N.D. CENT. CODE CH. 27-19 (1974).
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to the state courts, but its operation is not by its terms or authoritative
construction confined to them. However, to attribute to the statute
an intent that it limits the power of federal courts to entertain litiga-
tion between Indians is to attribute to it an intent that Indians be
deprived of the ability to enforce rights created by state law. This is
unwarranted. The policy of the statute is that, in view of the state's
lack of responsibility for reservation Indians, litigation involving
them should not be conducted in the state courts without their con-
sent. It is not to exclude litigation from the courts of the authority
in which responsibility for reservation Indians resides: the federal
government. This supports a determination that, in the terms of the
Rules of Decision Act, the North Dakota "door-closing" law does not
"apply" to federal diversity actions such as Poitra.
The Rules of Decision Act itself does not provide guidance on the
question of whether state laws governing subject-matter jurisdiction
"apply" to federal cases. If the intent of the act's provisions is that
such laws not be "regarded as rules of decision, ' 8 4 a federal court
could decline to apply them even if they do not confine themselves to
state courts. No such intent is found without reading the act either
as creating a substance-procedure distinction or, perhaps, as provid-
ing for the application of state law only when the federal constitution
requires it. The former reading is inconsistent with the act's past
application to matters of procedure 5 and the latter reading leaves
the act redundant of the Constitution. 6 No intent that state "door-
closing" laws be "rules ., decision" can be found, either. The term
" ' rules of decision' is hardly self-defining and the legislative his-
tory is sparse."8 7 To ask whether state "door-closing" laws are
"rules of decision" in diversity actions is simply to ask whether di-
versity actions are "cases where they apply." That question is ans-
wered not by the act, but by the judicially-created policy generated,
but not required, by the act and developed in cases following in the
wake of Erie.8
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
85. Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REV.
66, 76-90 (1955).
86. The Rules of Decision Act has been characterized as no more than a declaration
of what the law would have been without it. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
457, 464 (1831; Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923) ; ErieR. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 72 (1938) ; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945).
But see Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision--More on the Erie, 30 Ky. L.J. 3, 7 (1941).
It has been said in rebuttal that "There was sufficient doubt about the matter In 1789
to induce the first Congress to legislate." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 (1938)
(Reed, J., concurring in part). Kurland, Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the
Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 202-03 (1957), suggests that the Rules
of Decision Act is redundant of conflict of laws doctrines which in 1789 would have ap-
plied state law to diversity actions.
87. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 710 (1974).
88. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082, 1096 (1963).
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IV. THE POLICIES OF ERIE AND ITS "PROGENY"
Even if the Rules of Decision Act was implicated in Poitra, there
is another sense in which, strictly speaking, the case did not present
an Erie problem at all. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 9 which "held
that federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity
of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply
the unwritten law of the State. . . ."'o. Federal courts had always
given effect to the "positive statutes of the state"9 1 as well as federal
statutes. The holding in Erie did not alter this practice . 2 Seven years
after Erie, however, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the issue
of whether a state statute of limitations must be applied to a diver-
sity action by declaring, "Our starting point must be the policy of
federal jurisdiction which Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins embodies. ' 9 3
Erie repudiated not only Swift v. Tyson itself, but the "view of di-
versity jurisdiction"9 which it represented-one which infected
the application of state statutes by giving vent to the "impulse to
freedom from the rules that controlled- State courts regarding State-
created rights."' 5 The explanation of Erie's application to state sta-
tutes lies not in its holding but in its "policy of federal jurisdic-
tion."9s What-that policy is and how it should have been applied to
. Poitra is the key to the proper disposition of reservation-based di-
versity actions against Indians.
The policy emphasized by the Erie opinion itself is the preserva-
tion of the division of powers established by the Constitution. It
"expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of
judicial power between state and federal courts."98 By assuming
the power to declare "substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State" the federal courts had, in the Supreme Court's opinion, in-
fringed upon the power of the states, reserved to them by the Consti-
tution, to regulate their own legislative and judicial affairs.99 It is,
however, unclear whether the Supreme Court continues to accept the
89. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
90. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
91. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 17 (1842).
92. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1090
(1963): Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-examining Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co. and Reopening the Federal Courts, 48 N.C.L. REv. 56, 64 (1969).
93. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
94. Angel v. Bulltngton, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947).
95. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945). See Walker,
Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-examining Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. and Reopening
the Federal Courts, 48 N.C.L. REV. 56, 65 (1969).
96. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1091
(1963).
97. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938).
98. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); see Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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constitutional foundation of Erie.'00 It can be argued that the deci-
sion of a federal court to entertain or refuse to entertain a state-creat-
ed cause of action falls within the judicial power ceded by the states
to the federal government in Article III of the Constitution;101 the
federal court does not invade the state's residual sovereignty by enter-
taining an action which the state courts would not hear. The rejec-
tion of this argument and the survival of the constitutional doctrine
of Erie, however, would not justify the conclusion that a federal
court should not adjudicate a diversity action with Indian parties
arising on an Indian reservation. Here, assertion of a power to en-
tertain the action on its merits does not invade the authority of the
states to regulate their own legislative and judicial affairs. The
state courts' lack of jurisdiction stems from the very absence of
state authority. State courts refrain from adjudicating reservation-
based actions against Indians not to effectuate state policy on a mat-
ter falling within the state's reserved powers, but to withdraw from
a matter falling outside those reserved powers. Regulation of Indian
tribes is vested in the federal government and the tribes them-
selves. Reservation Indians are free from state control except inso-
far as Congress has conferred powers upon the states. 10 2 Whether
Indians are protected from state control in the form of state-court
jurisdiction by the federal "consent" statute,' 03 a state "consent" sta-
tute,0 4 or the federal doctrine of non-interference with tribal self-
government,0 5 the state courts' want of jurisdiction cannot affect
100. The constitutional basis of Erie has rarely been invoked by the Court. See Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350
U.S. 198, 202 (1956). The silence of the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, 826 U.S. 99 (1945), is most significant. Erie's constitutional imperative there ap-
pears reduced to a mere "policy." C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 229 (2d ed. 1970).
Constitutional doctrine might be implicit in the Court's reference to "cases where a legal
right as the basis for relief was created by State authority, and could not be created by
federal authority." Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. 99, 102; see Guaranty Trust, at 114 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). But the statement that "Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever
claim, the power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to create substantive
rights denied by State law," Guaranty Trust, at 105, implies a congressional power incon-
sistent with the constitutional premises of Erie. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 191-93 (1957).
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power,
49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1094 (1963): see Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 210-11 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) ; First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S.
896, 399 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) ; Stephenson v. Grand Trunk West-
ern R. Co., 110"F.2d 401, 405-06 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. granted, 310 U.S. 623 (1940), dis-
missed, 911 U.S. 720 (1940) ; Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 713 (4th
Cir. 1961). This falls within the wider argument, clearly at odds with Justice Brandeis'
opinion in Erie, that the federal judicial power itself includes the power to determine the
rules of law that are to apply to cases within it. V. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION Ch. 20, 21, 25, 26, passim (1953) ; V. Coot, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 138-46 (1942) ; Broh-Krahn, Amndinent by Decision-More on the
Erie Case, 30 Kr. L.". 3 (1941). Contra, Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53
Nw. U. L. Rgv. 427, 439-45 (1958). See also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91
(1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part).
102. Xilliams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); McClanahan v. State Tax Commission
of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 168-73 (1973).
103. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
104. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974).
105. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.
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the federal government's constitutional powers to regulate in its own
courts the legal rights and obligations of tribal Indians, 00 including
rights and obligations founded on state law.
Apart from the desire to properly apply the Rules of Decision
Act in light of perceived constitutional limitations upon federal po-
wers, the primary "policy of federal jurisdiction ' ' 10 7 voiced by Erie
was non-discrimination.
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to
prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against
those not citizens of the State. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave
discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights
enjoyed under the unwritten "general law" vary according
to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court; and the privilege -of selecting the court in
which the rights should be determined was conferred upon
the non-citizen. 10 8
The non-citizen could elect the body of common law-state or "federal
general"-most favorable to his position. In Erie, the Court sought
to terminate the election by abolishing one of the alternatives. 10 9
Granted that "Congress afforded out-of-State litigants another tribun-
al, not another body of law," 110 permitting federal courts to enter-
tain diversity actions arising on Indian reservations does not create
the spectre of litigants choosing between two bodies of law. There
Is only one body of law. It consists of rights created or recognized"1
by state law. A party does not escape it by choosing to have a claim
heard in a federal court. The law applied in federal court is the same
which would have been applied in a state court if jurisdiction over
the action existed. The policy of non-discrimination as expressed in
Erie itself does not require that the federal court dismiss such an
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966); Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1966).
106. The federal government has "plenary" power over tribal Indians. Winton v. Amos,
255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971) U.S.
DEPT. oF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 24 (1958); Comment, The Indian Battle for
Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 445, 447-52 (1970).
107. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
108. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938). "What [the Court] obviously
had In mind . . . was that although either a resident plaintiff or a nonresident defendant
can get Into federal court against the other's will, the situation is not so symmetrical
when a nonresident sues a resident. A resident defendant has no right to removal, see
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), and thus is stuck with the nonresident plaintiff's choice of either
forum. Thus in terms of ability to select the court, noncitizens are favored over citizens."
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 712 n.111 (1974). Before Erie,
ability to select the court included ability to choose between state common law and fed-
eral common law. Because Erie has been held to require federal courts to apply state con-
flict of laws rules, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the
ability of many plaintiffs to select the state in which suit is brought favors plaintiffs
(both resident and nonresident) with ability to choose among bodies of state law. See also
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). under which change of venue does not change
the state law applied to a diversity action.
109. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
110. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
111. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc.. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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action. Because there is, only one body of law, the uncertainty which
Erie identified with the existence of two co-existing bodies of law"12
should not exist. When there are two bodies of law with an uncer-
tain demarcation line between them, either of which might even-
tually be applied to a transaction or occurrence, substantial uncertain-
ty results.1 13 But in the diversity actions against Indians with which
this article is concerned, the standard of conduct is set by the
rights and obligations created or recognized by the law of the state
in which the federal court sits. 11 4 Opening the federal courthouse
door would not create a "debilitating uncertainty in the planning of
everyday affairs"' 15 arising from the possible application to primary
conduct of two sets of legal rules."1 6 The state and federal legal
systems would not provide inconsistent sets of directions.
The Supreme Court returned to Erie's policy of non-discrimination
In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York." 7 "Certainly," it said,
"the fortuitous circumstance of residence out of a state of one of the
parties to a litgation ought not to give rise to a discrimination against
others equally concerned but locally resident."" 8 The "policy of fed-
eral jurisdiction which Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins embodies""' 9 went
beyond the abolition of a body of "federal general common law'
12 0
co-existing with state common law.
In essence, the intent of that decision was to ensure that, in
all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties,
the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in
a State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially
different result. . . .
[SIince a federal court adjudicating a state-created right
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the part-
ies is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the
State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is
112. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
113. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
114. It is possible that the state, having failed to provide a state-court remedy, created
or recognized no rights or obligations. Compare Angel v. Bulltngton, 330 U.S. 183 (1947),
with Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974).
115. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. It is significant that substantial uncertainty exists when modern conflict of laws
doctrines govern the application of legal rules to primary conduct. Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 710 (1974).
117. 826 U.S. 99 (1945). It did so again in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965).
118. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
119. Id. at 101.
120. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect
the enforcement of the right as given by the State.121
From this! emerged the so-called "outcome-determinative" test: 122
if "it significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation for a federal
court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an ac-
tion upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court, ' 123
the federal court must apply the state law. The outcome-determinative
test required that the New York statute of limitations invoked in
Guaranty Trust be applied, for it operated as a complete bar to a
suit brought upon the same cause of action in a state court. 1 24 Uncriti-
cal application of the outcome-determinative test requires that any
law withholding jurisdiction over a cause of action from state courts
be applied in federal diversity actions, for the law operates as a com-
plete bar to a suit brought in a state court upon the same claim.
The Ninth Circuit in Littell v. Nakai'25 and Hot Oil Service, Inc. v.
Hal126 and the district court in Poitra v. Demarrias'2 ' adopted this
approach where jurisdiction over causes of action arising within In-
dian reservations was withheld from state courts by federal law.
V. THE TRIUMPH OF OUTCOME-DETERMINATION
It was not clear after Guaranty Trust that the Supreme Court's
philosophy of outcome-determination was intended to apply to every
situation in which state courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
an action brought before a federal court. Its opinion had said, "Plain-
ly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a, suit if
brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and
not merely formally or negligibly.' ' 1 28 It is not "plain" that every law
which bars recovery in a state court "bears on a State-created right
vitally. . . ." The Court apparently had in mind a state procedural
law which affects the "forms and mode of enforcing the right"'' 2 9 with-
out preventing the right's enforcement when it referred to a law which
"bears on a State-created right .. .merely formally or negligibly."
If, however, a law prevented enforcement of the right in a state
court but was not intended to bar its enforcement in every forum,
and if its enforcement by a federal court would not defeat a state
policy on a matter of state concern, could not a federal court pro-
121. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
122. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 55, at 226 (2nd ed. 1970).
123. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
124. Id. at 110.
125. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
126. 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
127. 369 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.D. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Or. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 934 (1975).
128. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
129. Id. at 108.
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perly conclude that the law does not bear upon the state-created right
"vitally" and decline to apply the law to itself?
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the Supreme
Court's decisions in Angel v. Bullington130 and Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co.131 Both involved the application to federal courts of state
statutes, characterized as "door-closing' '1 32 laws, which had the ef-
fect of closing the doors of state courts to plaintiffs with valid causes
of action. In Angel, Bullington, a citizen of Virginia, had sold land
in Virginia to Angel, a citizen of North Carolina. Angel paid part of
the purchase price by executing a series of notes secured by a deed
of trust on the land. Up-on default on one of the notes, the other notes
were accelerated, the trustees sold the land and the proceeds of the
sale were applied to the payment of the notes. As a deficiency re-
mained, Bullington brought suit against Angel in the Superior Court
of North Carolina. Angel demurred on the ground that a North Caro-
lina statute precluded recovery of a deficiency judgment. The statute
provided:
In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees
under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of
trust .. .the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes se-
cured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled
to a deficiency judgment on account of such, mortgage, deed
of trust or obligation secured by the same .... 133
The superior court overruled the demurrer but on appeal by Angel,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the statute operated
to bar the action and ordered that the action be dismissed.14 Bulling-
ton then brought a diversity action for the same relief in a North
Carolina federal court. The district court, and on appeal the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, rejected Angel's contention
that the North Carolina statute operated as a bar to Bullington's ac-
tion in federal courts as well as in state courts. 3' Bullington had ar-
gued in the state supreme court that application of the deficiency
judgment statute violated the "full faith and credit clause" of the
federal constitution." 6 In rejecting this argument, the court had said:
[T]he limitation created by the statute is upon the jurisdic-
tion of the court in that it is declared that the holder of notes
given to secure the purchase price of real property "shall not
130. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
131. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
132. See note 79 supra.
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-36 (1943), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (Supp.
1975).
134. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E.2d 411 (1941).
135. Bulltngton v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.N.C. 1944), aff'd, 150 F.2d 679 (4th Cir
1945), rev'd, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
136. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (an issue which no federal court has reached).
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be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account" thereof....
The statute operates on the adjective law of the state,
which pertains to the practice and procedure, or legal ma-
chinery by which the substantive law is made effective, and
not upon the substantive law itself. It is limitation of the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
1 3 7
The federal district court and Court of Appeals borrowed this charac-
terization of the deficiency judgment statute and employed it to re-
solve the issue of the statute's applicability to diversity actions. They
held that it was not applicable, invoking the pre-Erie doctrine (repre-
sented by David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club of America) 1 3
that when a cuase of action exists and the requisites of the federal
statute conferring jurisdiction are present, federal jurisdiction can-
not be restricted by state statutes. The Court of Appeals 139 thought
this doctrine to be unaffected by Guaranty Trust, despite the Su-
preme Court's statement that a federal court "cannot afford recovery
if the right to recover is made unavailable by the State. .. .
The Supreme Court reversed,' 41 Justice Frankfurter delivering an
opinion not unfairly described by Justice Rutledge's dissent as "an
'and/or' hodgepodge of res judicata and Erie doctrines."' 42 Justice
Frankfurter took the view that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
had adjudicated the "merits" of Bullington's action because it had
considered whether the state deficiency judgment statute barred
the action and, if so, whether its application would violate the "full
faith and credit clause.' 4 3 It followed that the judgment of the state
court operated as a bar to suit on the same cause of action not only
in North Carolina state courts, but also in federal courts.144 He im-
plied that the federal court was required by Guaranty Trust to dis-
miss the action because it could not have been entertained in the
state courts after the state supreme court's decision,'145 but did not
make clear whether this result flowed from the federal courts' res
judicata doctrine or the application of state res judicata rules under
the Erie doctrine.
If the state supreme court's decision rested merely on the ground
that the state courts lacked power to hear the case and did not give
the deficiency judgment statute a construction which closed the doors
of federal courts as well as state courts, it would have been res
judicata for purposes of Bullington's federal diversity action. The
137. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941).
138. 225 U.S. 489 (1912).
139. Angel v. Bullington, 150 F.2d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 1945).
140. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
141. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
142. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 201 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
143. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191 (1947).
144. Id. at 186-87.
145. Id. at 187.
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lower federal courts, drawing on the language of the state supreme
court's opinion, so interpreted the decision, 14 6 but Justice Frankfurter
did not. He thought that the court had spoken only of the jurisdic-
tion of state courts because it was concerned only with state courts.
The statute, as construed, expressed a state policy that deficiency
judgments on mortgages and deeds of trust should not be obtained.
It was the duty of federal courts to follow this policy in diversity
actions, not to defeat it by giving that which the state has withheld.
It would be incongruous, thought Justice Frankfurter, to attribute
to the North Carolina legislature and judiciary an intention to allow
citizens of other states to obtain deficiency judgments against North
Carolinians while barring suits by its own citizens, and discriminatory
to achieve such a result. 147 The Court decided, accordingly, that Bul-
lington's diversity action could not be entertained. Justice Frank-
furter disposed of the doctrine that state statutes could not restrict
the jurisdiction of a federal court by saying,
Cases like David Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club of Ameri-
ca are obsolete insofar as they are based on a view of diver-
sity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins. That decision drastically limited the power of
federal district courts to entertain suits in diversity cases that
could not be brought in the respective state courts or were
barred by defenses controlling in the state courts.
1 48
More accurately, the "view of diversity" which made David Lup-
ton's Sons "obsolete" came to an end in Guaranty Trust, which al-
tered the application of state statutes to diversity actions and re-
quired federal courts to "mirror" the outcome of actions pursued in
state courts,'4 9 even where that outcome was determined by pro-
cedural statutes.
Without doing so explicitly, Angel v. Bullington appears to hold
that because the North Carolina statute had deprived state courts
of jurisdiction to entertain actions for deficiency judgments, North
Carolina federal courts must refuse to entertain such actions in or-
der to produce the same result as in actions brought before state
courts, regardless of whether an action had first been instituted in
a state court. 10 But the decision rests on more than the state courts'
146. This interpretation and the David Lupton's Sons doctrine that a federal court's
Jurisdiction cannot be affected by a state statute are the bases of the dissents by three
Justices In Angel v. Bullington. Id. at 193-201 (Reed, J., dissenting, with whom Jackson
& Rutledge, JJ., joined); Id. at 201-11 (Rutledge, J., dissenting, with whom Jackson, J.,
joined).
147. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947).
148. Id. at 192.
149. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1090-91
(1963); see Angel v. Bullington, 30 U.S. 183, 211 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 558-59 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
150. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1088-90
(1963).
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want of jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter denied that the state statute
was a mere limitation of jurisdiction. 1 51 Reflected, but not clearly
articulated, in his opinion is an analysis of the policies underlying the
deficiency judgment statute and consideration of whether those- poli-
cies could be defeated by the failure of federal courts to apply the
statute to themselves. The statute was not enacted to regulate the in-
ternal machinery of the state judicial system. It was a depression-era
measure obviously designed to shield North Carolina debtors from de-
ficiency judgments152-an important matter of state concern. The
statute had not been construed by state courts to allow deficiency
judgments when the claim was founded on a contract made outside
North Carolina or when the mortgage or deed of trust was held on
real property located outside the state. If North Carolina federal
courts entertained actions for deficiency judgments against North
Carolinians, they would defeat the protection the state intended to
give its debtors. The state court's characterization of the statute as a
limitation of jurisdiction, pertaining to procedure and not sub-
stance, 13 was used to uphold the statute's constitutionality under the
"full faith and credit clause." The Supreme Court correctly declined
to borrow it for the purpose of resolving a very different issue facing
the federal courts.
The policy found in the North Carolina deficiency judgment sta-
tute by the Supreme Court stands in marked contrast to the policy of
the North Dakota "consent" statute' 5 4 mentioned earlier. The latter
"completely disclaim[s] state jurisdiction over civil causes of ac-
tion arising on an Indian reservation unless the Indians themselves
have acted to accept jurisdiction. . . .,,15 The North Carolina statute
is no disclaimer. It was intended to shield debtors from liability on a
matter in which the state was responsible and citizens looked to the
state for legal protection. The North Dakota statute reflects no in-
tention to shield Indians from liability for wrongful death. It disclaim-
ed state jurisdiction because Indians were the responsibility of the fed-
eral and tribal governments and had not chosen to look to the state
for legal protection, although the option was open to them. The state
policy was "hands off," not "no liability." A state "hands off" po-
licy, especially one premised upon the federal government's respon-
sibility for the subject matter, is not defeated by a federal court's deci-
sion to entertain a cause of action which state courts cannot hear.
151. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183. 191 (1947).
152. It was a companion to other measures for the protection of debtors, such as a
statute entitling the owner of land to an injunction against its sale or confirmation of Its
sale by a mortgagee or trustee, on the ground that the sale price was Inadequate. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-32 (1943), as amened, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34 (Supp. 1975).
153. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941).
154. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974).
155. In re Whiteshield, 124 N.W.2d 694, 698 (N.D. 1963).
CAN FEDERAL COURTS REMAIN OPEN
When the state "consent" statute is removed from consideration and
the absence of state-court jurisdiction is founded entirely on the fed-
eral "consent" statute '56 or the federal doctrine of non-interference
with Indian self-government, 1 57 there exists no state policy which
would be served by a federal court's refusal to accept jurisdiction.
The "policy of federal jurisdiction""" found in Angel v. Bullington
was not pure "outcome-determination," i.e., blind conformity to the
result of litigation heard in state court. It ascertained state policies
implicated in state law and required that federal courts give effect to
those policies in diversity actions. It appeared to leave federal courts
free not to conform to laws prevailing in state courts if no identifiable
state policy would be served by conformity.
This freedom, if real, was short-lived. Two years after Angel v.
Bullington, the Supreme Court in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co."59 re-
quired the application of a state "door-closing" law to a diversity ac-
tion without determining that this was necessary to fulfill state po-
licy. In Woods, a foreign corporation sued a Mississippi resident-in a
Mississippi federal court. It sought recovery of a broker's commis-
sion allegedly due on the sale of the defendant's Mississippi real
estate. A Mississippi statute provided that each foreign corporation
doing business in the state was required to file a written power of
attorney designating a resident agent for service of process in suits
against it. It further provided: "Any foreign corporation failing
to comply with the above provisions shall not be permitted to
bring or maintain any action or suit in any of the courts of the
state. ' 1 60 The district court found that the plaintiff was doing busi-
ness in Mississippi and held that its failure to qualify to do business
in the state, as required by this statute and others, 16' rendered its con-
tract with the defendant void. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Fifth
Circuit held that the effect of the statute was not to make the contract
void, but to deny foreign corporations not complyling with it permis-
sion to institute actions in state courts. 16 2 Then it held that
the prohibition in the State law closing the doors of the State
courts extends no further than the State courts. The State of
Mississippi is without authority to limit or extend the juris-
156. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970). The courts In Poitra v. Demarrias, 369 F. Supp. 257
(D.N.D. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975), ig-
nored the state "consent" statute.
157. Littel v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966). Hot
Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
158. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
159. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
160. Miss. LAWS 1928, ch. 90, § 11, as amended, Miss. CODE 3 79-3-247 (1972).
161. MISS. CODE § 79-1-19 (1972) ; Miss. LAWS 1916, ch. 92, § 1, repealed by Miss. LAWS
1962, ch. 235, § 149 ; Miss. CODE § 27-17-325 (1972).
162. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1948), reh., 170 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
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diction of the federal courts. If diversity of citizenship exists,
the fact that a foreign corporation may not sue in State Courts
because it has not complied with the conditions of doing busi-
ness within the State does not shut the doors of the federal
court sitting in that State.
163
The Supreme Court reversed,'6 4  holding that under Guaranty
Trust, Mississippi's "door-closing" statute closed the doors of feder-
al courts to diversity actions, as had North Carolina's statute in
Angel v. Bullington.
[F]or purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court
is "in effect, only another court of the State. . ,,115
[Guaranty Trust] was premised on the, theory that a right
which local law creates but which it does not supply with a
remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement in a
federal court in a diversity case; that where in such cases
one is barred from recovery in the state court; he should
likewise be barred in the federal court.1
6 6
This was pure "outcome-determination." It was necessary, assert-
ed the Court, to avoid discrimination against citizens of the forum
state, as Erie intended.1 6 7 But the Mississippi "door-closing" statute
discriminated agaist non-citizens.168 Non-application of the state sta-
tute to diversity actions would have enabled non-citizens to obtain
remedies already available to citizens. 16 9
No consideration of state policies appears in the Woods opinion.
The Court left states unable to close the doors of their own courts
163. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 1948), citing David
Lupton's Sons v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489 (1912). On rehearing, the
court stated that Angel v. Bullington did not overrule David Lupton's Sons with respect
to the question before It. Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 170 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir.
1948). However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S.
635, 536-37 (1949), re-asserted the demise of David Lupton's Sons.
164. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
165. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
166. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949). The three dissenting jus-
tices took the position, as had the dissenters in Angel v. Bllingt on, that the state statute,
as properly construed by the Court of Appeals, went no further than withholding a remedy
in state courts without preventing actions elsewhere, and the absence of a state-court
remedy did not require federal courts to dismiss the action. Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting, with whom Rutledge & Burton, JJ.,
joined) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557-61 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
167. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949).
168. State courts were open to suits against non-qualifying foreign corporations. Miss.
CODE § 79-1-27 (1972) ; Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 1948).
169. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-examining Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.
and Reopening the Federal Conrts, 48 N.C. L. REv. 56, 66-7 (1969). The view that "Con-
gress afforded out-of-State litigants another tribunal, not another body of law," Guaranty
Trust of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945), suggests that non-application of state
law by federal courts is an impermissible means of neutralizing bias against non-citizens.
Justice RutIc3ge was of the contrary view that one of the purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion "was to L_''Ord a federal court remedy when, for at least some reasons of state pol-
icy, none .,ould be available in state courts." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 558 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 119 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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without also closing the doors of federal courts. 170 Nevertheless, it
is unlikely that an analysis of state policy would have altered the
result in Woods. The Mississippi requirement that foreign corpora-
tions qualify to do business in the state served the enforcement of
state revenue laws.171 The requirement that foreign corporations ap-
point a resident agent for service of process enabled persons with
legal claims arising from a foreign corporation's Mississippi activ-
ities to enforce legal claims against it within the state. The protec-
tion of state revenues and the provision of a convenient forum for
persons wronged 'by foreign corporations were important state poli-
cies promoted by the sanction of closing state courts to foreign cor-
porations which failed to comply with state law. Non-application of
the "door-closing" statute to diversity actions would have frustrat-
ed these polilcies by enabling foreign corporations to avoid the san-
ction when it was most costly. A foreign corporation could sue a
Mississippi resident in federal court whenever the amount in contro-
versy was more than $3,000 and it was unnecessary to join a Mis-
sissippi resident as a plaintiff. 1' 2 A state "door-closing" law based
on a desire to protect the defendant or an objection to the relief
sought by the plaintiff, as in Angel v. Bullington,17 1 or the imposi-
tion of a sanction against the plaintiff, as in Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co.,, stands in contrast to a "door-closing" law designed to
conserve the resources of state courts 74 or avoid intrusion into the
jurisdiction of other governments, as in Poitra v. Demarrias. When
the latter type of "door-closing" law is invoked as a bar to diver-
170. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 539 (1949) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting).
171. Id. at 539-40.
172. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, ch. 2, § 24, 1 1, 36 Stat. 1091, repealed -by
Judiciary Act of June 25. 1948 ; ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 996 ; Judiciary Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 930, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) (now $10,000). Diversity
of citizenship would not now exist If the corporation's principal place of business were
in Mississippi. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
173. See Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 511 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1975),
In which the court held that a telephone customer could not obtain relief against the en-
forcement of tariffs filed with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in a diversity action
against the telephone company. The Oklahoma Constitution, art. IX, § 20, prohibits state
courts other than the supreme court from reviewing public utility regulations prescribed
by the Corporation Commission. This withholds from state trial courts jurisdiction over
actions for relief from the enforcement of public utility tariffs on the ground of their In-
validity. State ex rel. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 204 Okla. 134, 227 P.2d 666 (1950) ;
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Bartlett-Collins Co., 204 Okla. 379, 230 P.2d 481 (1951).
Citing Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., the court held that because state trial courts lacked
Jurisdiction over the action, federal trial courts lacked diversity jurisdiction. Teleco, Inc.
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 511 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1975). This decision
served the state policy of limiting judicial review of Corporation Commission orders, but
Woods does not close the federal courts unless all state courts are closed. See Markham
V. City of Nwport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961) ; S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New
Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D.N.J. 1967). A better rationale for
the decision in Teleco would have been that state law, in effect, provided for no cause of
action against a public utility for relief from enforcement of Its tariffs (just as state law
in Angel v. Bullington provided, in effect, for no cause of action for a deficiency judg-
ment) and a federal court could not grant relief which state law withheld. Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
174. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.317[6] at 3538 (1959) ; Note, Effect of State
Statute on Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 24 IND. L.J. 418, 422-23 (1949).
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sity jurisdiction, Woods and Angel can be distinguished on the ground
that non-application of the law would not subvert state policy. The
case could then be approached on its merits. This has been done
in recent years by lower federal courts 75 but not the Supreme Court.
In First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc.,'
1 76
it was necessary to decide whether an Illinois statute which provided
that
no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State to
recover damages for a death occurring outside of this State
where a right of action for such death exists under the laws
of the place where such death occurred and service of pro-
cess in such suit may be had upon the defendant in such
place1 77
prevented Illinois federal courts from entertaining diversity actions
for wrongful deaths occurring outside Illinois. After Woods, the Se-
venth Circuit had reversed its earlier position 1 78 and held that state
law closed the federal courts to such actions. 17 9 The plaintiff in First
National, Bank argued that the statute violated the "full faith and
credit clause" of the federal constitution. 1 0 The Supreme Court could
have avoided the constitutional issue by examining the policies under-
lying the legislation, finding no more than a policy of reducing the
caseload of state courts by the exclusion of foreign causes of ac-
tion which could be pursued elsewhere,' 8' determining that state poli-
cies would not be frustrated if these actions were heard in federal
courts, thereby distinguishing Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. and
Angel v. Bullington, and, as a consequence, refusing to apply the
Illinois statute to diversity actions. This the Court refused to do. It
reached the constitutional issue and decided it in the plaintiff's fa-
vor-apparently foreclosing the argument that "door-closing" laws
do not bar diversity actions when leaving federal courts open does
not frustrate state policies. 8 2 Justice Frankfurter, while dissenting
175. See text accompanying notes 201-36 infra and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 183 F.2d 640, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1950).
176. 342 U.S. 396 (1952), reh. denied, 343 U.S. 921 (1952).
177. ILL. LAWS 1935, p. 916, § 2, as amended, ILL. ANN. STATS., ch. 70, § 2 (Supp. 1975).
This provision was repealed by ILL. LAWS 1963, p. 3248, § 2.
178. Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 110 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1940), cert.
granted, 310 U.S. 623 (1940), dismissed, 311- U.S. 720 (1940); Davidson v. Gardner, 172
F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1949).
179. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1950); Munch
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 184 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1950); First National Bank of Chicago
v. United Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 396
(1952), reh. denied, 343 U.S. 921 (1952).
180. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
181. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493, 495 (7th Cir.
1951); Note, Federal Courts-Federal Jurisdiction.-Effect of State Statutes, 20 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 343, 344 (1952).
182. The Court held that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional under Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951), where it had struck down a Wisconsin statute barring actions for
wrongful deaths occurring outside the state. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 331.03 (1958), as amended,
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on the constitutional issue, was of the opinion that "the series of
cases culminating in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co." required Illi-
nois federal courts to apply the state statute. 1 3 There are no indica-
tions that more than one of the five justices who joined the opin-
ion of the Court in First National Bank disagreed with Justice Frank-
furter on the latter point.18 4 Accordingly, the law as it stood in 1952
was that whenever a valid state law prevented state courts from
entertaining a cause of action, it also prevented the federal courts
in that state from entertaining the same cause within their diver-
sity jurisdiction. The state could not close its own doors without clos-
ing the federal courts'.'15 With federal courts required to "mirror"
state courts,'18 6 it logically followed that when federal law closed state
courts, it also closed federal courts to diversity actions. 8 7
VI. THE DECLINE OF OUTCOME-DETERMINATION
The Supreme Court has not spoken on the question in the quar-
ter-century since First National Bank, but its opinion in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative1 8s has led lower federal courts
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (1966). The Illinois statute at issue In First National Bank,
unlike the Wisconsin statute in Hughes v. Fetter, closed state courts only when an action
for wrongful death existed under the laws of the place where death occurred and the de-
fendant could be served with process there. This condition ensured that the statute would
not leave a plaintiff without any forum In which his action could be entertained. This
significant difference between the Wisconsin and Illinois statutes should have led the Court
to conclude that the invalidation of the former in Hughes v. Fetter had not necessarily
Invalidated the latter. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S.
396, 401 (1952) (Reed, J., dissenting). The Court had said that it was "not crucial here,
that Wisconsin may well be the only jurisdiction in which service could be had ....
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951). While "not crucial," it was "relevant." Id.
Therefore, the explanation of the Court's reliance on a constitutional ground in First Na-
tional Bank may be that the majority believed that no non-constitutional ground for
reversal existed, rather than that the majority believed that the constitutional question in
First National Bank was the same question it had passed upon in Hughes v. Fetter. Jus-
tice Jackson, on the other hand, disagreed with the Court's invalidation of the Illinois
statute but believed that state "door-closing" laws do not operate to withhold diversity
jurisdiction from federal courts under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, First National Bank of
Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 399-400 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring
In the result) see Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538-40 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 197-200 (Reed, J., dissenting, with
whom Jackson & Rutledge, JJ., joined). However, he, too, made no attempt to distinguish
the "door-closing" statute in First National Bank from those in Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co. and Angel v. Bullington.
183. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 401 (1952)
(Frankfurther, J., dissenting).
184. Justice Burton had joined Justice Jackson's dissent in Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538-40 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting, with whom Rutledge & Burton,
JJ., joined). Justice Clark was appointed to the court after Woods. Chief Justice Vinson,
Justice Black and Justice Douglas joined the opinions of the Court in both Woods and
First National Bank. Justice Reed, dissenting in First National Bank, joined the opinion
of the Court in Woods but had authored a dissent in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183,
193-201 (1947) (Reed, J. dissenting).
185. A state statute which explicitly excepted federal courts from its operation might not
have had the effect of closing federal courts.
186. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082, 109A (1963).
187. Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966) ;
Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1966). Contra, Poitra v. Demar-
rias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975). This assumes that
the governing legislation has not made an explicit exception for federal courts.
188. 356 U.S. 525 (1958), reh. denied, 357 U.S. 933 (1958).
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to believe once again that they are authorized to entertain actions
to which the courts of their states are closed. es In Byrd, the Court
remanded a diversity action to the district court for resolution of a
factual issue. 190 The question arose whether on remand, the trial
judge should commit this issue to the jury or weigh conflicting evi-
dence and decide the issue himself, as required by state law. 191 The
defendant argued that Erie required the federal court to folliow state
practice in this particular. The Court disagreed for three reasons.
First, "[i]t was decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that the fed-
eral courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-
created rights and obligations by the state courts"' 192 by conforming
to the "rule[s] intended to be bound up with the definition of the
rights and obligations of the parties. ' 1 9 3 The state law invoked by
the defendant here was not a rule "intended to be bound up with
the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties." Second,
although cases following Erie had "evinced a broader policy to the
effect that the federal courts should conform as near as may be-
in the absence of other considerations-to state rules ... where [they]
may bear substantially" on the outcome of litigation,' 9 4
there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. The federal system is an independent system for admin-
istering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdic-
tion. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner
in which, in civil common law actions, it distributes trial fun-
ctions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if
not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the
decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. . . .. [T]he
inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury de-
cisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state
rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the liti-
gation should not come out one way in the federal court and
another way in the state court.'9 5
189. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Sun Sales
Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456 F.2d 857, 862-63 (3rd Cir. 1972) : Poitra v. De-
marrias, 502 F.2d 23, 25-6 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975); Miller v.
Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 313-15 (6th Cir. 1974). But see Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966) ; Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d
295, 297 (9th Cir. 1966). This trend was foreshadowed by Meador, State Law and the
Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1099-1101 (1963).
190. Byrd was a negligence action In which the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had
the status of a statutory employee and was therefore barred from maintaining a common-
law action against the defendant by provisions of the South Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, S.C. CODE § 72-121 (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE § 72-121 (Supp.
1974); S.C. Acrs 1936, D. 1231, § 11, repealed by S.C. AcTs 1969, p. 622, § 2. Whether
the plaintiff was a statutory employee depended upon whether the work contracted to be
done by the plaintiff's employer was work of the kind also done by the defendant's own
construction and maintenance crews. S.C. CODE § 72-111 (1962) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 526-27 (1958). The Supreme Court remanded the
case for a new finding on this question of fact. Id. at 531-33.
191. Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957).
192. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
193. Id. at 536.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 537-38.
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The Court concluded that this "strong federal policy" should not
yield to state law.1 96 Third, the likelihood that committing the issue
to the jury would cause the litigation to have a different result in
federal court than it would have had in state court was not "so
strong as to require the federal practice . . . to yield to the state rule
in the interest of uniformity of outcome.
'1 7
The "influence . . . of the Seventh Amendment" and unlikelihood
of different results from judge and jury determinations of the factual
issue to be resolved on remand invite a "conservative reading of
Byrd" as a decision "limited by its peculiar facts."'' 98 But it signals
a retreat from outcome-determination to a position in which a state
law need not be applied to a diversity action if it is not "bound
up" with state-created rights and obligations- 9 and if federal poli-
cies which would be frustrated by the application of the state law
weigh more heavily on the balance than state policies underlying
the law. Byrd may thus have opened federal courts to suits over
which state courts lack jurisdiction when the law withholding juris-
diction from state courts, although it left rights without remedies
and obligations without enforcement, was not "intended to be bound
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties ' 200
and countervailing federal policies would be fulfilled by the exer-
cise of federal jurisdiction.
The signal emanating from Byrd was picked up and greatly
amplified by the Fourth Circuit in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
20
1
Following an airplane crash in Tennessee, the representatives of
the victims' estates, all of whom were citizens of Illinois, brought
wrongful death actions in a South Carolina federal court against
the Delaware corporation which manufactured the aircraft and the
South Carolina corporation which serviced it before the crash. The
Delaware corporation moved for dismissal, contending that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the claims against it because South Carolina
law withheld from state courts jurisdiction over suits brought by
non-residents against foreign corporations on causes of action aris-
ing outside the state. 20 2 The Court of Appeals held that state law
did not, under Erie, restrict the district court's jusisdiction and re-
196. Id. at 538.
197. Id. at 540.
198. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law:
Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 613, 710 (1967).
199. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1100 (1963).
200. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958). How-
ever, this suggestion appears Inconsistent with the assertion In Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949), that "a right which local law creates but which it does not
supply with a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement in a federal court In
a diversity case .. "
201. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
202. S.C. CODE § 10-214 (1962).
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quire it to dismiss the action. After reviewing Erie, Guaranty Trust,
Angel, Woods and Byrd, the court announced:
The spirit of these decisions makes it appropriate for a court
attempting to resolve a federal-state conflict in a diversity
case to undertake the following analysis:
1. If the state provision, whether legislatively adopted or
judicially declared, is the substantive right or obligation at
issue, it is constitutionally controlling.
2. If the state provision is a procedure intimately bound up
with the state right or obligation, it is likewise constitution-
ally controlling.
3. If the state procedural provision is not intimately
bound up with the right being enforced but its application
would substantially affect the outcome of the litigation, the
federal diversity court must still apply it unless there are
affirmative countervailing federal considerations. This is not
deemed a constitutional requirement but one dictated by com-
ity.203
In applying the first two steps of this three-step analysis, the
court concluded that the South Carolina "door-closing" statute was
procedural, not substantive, and not "bound up" with the substan-
tive rights asserted, i.e., the causes of action for wrongful death,
because they arose under the laws of Tennessee, where the deaths
occurred.2 ° The "door-closing" law of one legal system is easily
typed as a law not "bound up" with the rights of the parties when-
ever those rights and obligations are thought to arise in a different
legal system. If this is sound, the North Carolina deficiency judg-
ment statute applied in Angel was not "bound up" with the rights
and obligations of the parties because they arose under the law of




is difficult to accept that a statute intended to nullify otherwise ex-
isting rights and obligations of creditors and debtors was not (in
the language of Byrd) "intended to be bound up with the definition
of the rights and obligations, 2 0 6 even though it was authoritatively
described as a procedural "limitation of the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state. 2 0 7 Wherever they may "arise," rights and obligations
exist within a state only when they are recognized by the law pre-
vailing in that state. If the policy of the "door-closing" law is to
nullify rights and obligations within the limits of state power, the
law should be regarded as "bound up" with them. If the policy of
203. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 849 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1965).
204. Id. at 64.
205. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. Re. 1082, 1101
(1963).
206. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 56 (1958).
207. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941).
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a "door-closing" law is to conserve the resources of state courts or
avoid intrusion upon the spheres of other governments, and state
interests are not advanced by a universal inability to enforce the
rights and obligations involved, the law should be regarded as not
"bound up" with those rights and obligations. The court in Szantay
had difficulty in identifying the state policies underlying the South
Carolina "door-closing" statute before it. The most likely possibili-
ties-promotion of judicial economy and avoidance of a forum non
conveniens 2 8-support the court's conclusion that the law was not
"bound up" with the parties' rights and obligations with respect to
wrongful death.
The court's third step required it to identify federal policies fav-
oring the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over the case and weigh
them against state policies which would be frustrated by the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. As no identifiable state policy would be frustra-
ted, the weight of any federal policy favoring adjudication of the
plaintiffs' claims on their merits would open the doors of the fed-
eral court. 20 9 One was found in the "full faith and credit clause"
of the federal constitution, 210 which "expresses a national interest
'looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obliga-
tions or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister
states.' ,,211 The "most fundamental" policy, however, was
that expressed in the constitutional extension of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction to the federal courts in suits between citizens
of different states. 21 2 The purpose of this jurisdictional grant
was to avoid discrimination against nonresidents.
2 1 3
The South Carolina statute was discriminatory because it denied
non-residents the privilege of suing foreign corporations on foreign
causes of action while granting it to residents. 21 4 Opening the fed-
eral courts would counteract this discrimination without creating
discrimination against South Carolina residents. They could sue for-
eign corporations on foreign causes of action in either state or fed-
eral courts. 21 5 With "affirmative countervailng federal considera-
208. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. .1965). Less plausible is
the hypothesis that' the statute was intended to encourage foreign corporations to do busi-
ness in South Caroline. Id. at 65.
209. The court distinguished Angel v. Bullington and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. on
the ground that in those cases, state policies existed which would have been frustrated by
permitting the actions to nroceed in federal courts. Id. at 66.
210. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
211. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1965), quoting from
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
212. Citing U.S. CoNST. art. ITT, § 2.
213. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1965).
214. Id.
215. For this reason, the court believed that application of the state statute to federal
courts was not indicated by the "twin aims of the Erie rule" which the Supreme Court
had recently identified in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965): "discouragement
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tions '' 216 identified, the court held that the state "door-closing" statute
did not exclude the actions before it from federal courts.
Whether this decision actually served the policy of the constitu-
tional grant of diversity jurisdiction depends, of course, upon what
that policy is. 2 7 Constitutional policy could not have been served if
diversity jurisdiction was intended only to provide a neutral tribunal
in which citizens of other states might escape the prejudice which
sometimes prevails against them in state courts. 21 8 If state courts
are closed by a "door-closing" statute, non-citizens cannot suffer
prejudice in them. If diversity jurisdiction had the wider 'objective
of affording to litigants a federal court remedy when none existed
in state courts, 219 constitutional policy would provide some justifica-
tion for non-application of state "door-closing" laws. The authorita-
tive judicial statement of the purposes of diversity jurisdiction- that
of Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux 2 0
-- does not suggest that the founding fathers wished to render diver-
sity defendants more readily suable in federal courts than they
would be in state courts.22 1 Nevertheless, several federal courts have
followed Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp. in finding that "door-clo-
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." By "inequit-
able administration of the laws," the Court meant unfair discrimination against citizens
of the forum state. Id. at 468 n.9. Although Szantay involved discrimination against non-
citizens, the Court of Appeals though that it was furthering the intention of Erie to "pre-
vent different legal treatment of parties merely because of a variation in the residence of
their opponent." Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1965). The
plaintiffs had engaged in "forum shopping." They had chosen a federal forum because if
it failed to apply the state "door-closing" statute, the governing law would favor the
plaintiffs more than the law a state forum would apply-a situation the Supreme Court
sought to avoid in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965). But forum shopping is
an evil only if something evil flows from it. Otherwise, it simply exercises the choice
between alternatives afforded by the grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts. Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 1ARV. L .REv. 693, 710 (1974). No evil flowed from
forum shopping in Szantay. The non-resident defendant did not become liable because the
plaintiffs were non-residents. It would also have been held liable in diversity actions brought
by residents. Note, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 560, 564 (1966).
216. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1965).
217. The purposes of the fathers of the Constitution in incorporating diversity jurisdictl.
within the federal Judicial power are considered in Friendly, The Historih Basis of Diver-
sity Jurisdiction, 41 H.aV. L. REV. 483 (1928); Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal
Judicial System, 13 LAW. & CONTEM.P. PROB. 3, 22-8 (1948) ; Pii1lipF & Christensen, The
Historical and Legal Background of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959 (1960);
Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 8G9,
869-76 (1931).
218. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 I-ARV.
L. REV. 49, 83 (1923). See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87
(1809); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 74 (1938) ; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945).
219. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 119 (1945) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 558 (1949) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d' 308, 316-17 (6th Cir. 1974). Friendly,
The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 495-97 (1928), asserts
that a principal reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction was a desire to protect non-
resident creditors against state legislation favorable to debtors.
220. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
221. Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 920 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1963),
where (in the context of deciding that Vermont state law governs whether a Vermont
fedeal court has in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation) the court denied
that there was any federal policy to provide a federal forum in Vermont to either a citi-
zen or a non-citizen when state courts would not hear the action.
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sing" laws were not "bound up" with rights and obligations arising
under the laws of another jurisdiction and weighing state policies
underlying "door-closing" laws against federal policies, found in the
grant of diversity jurisdiction, favoring the exercise of jurisdiction
by federal courts. In Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land, Inc.,2 22 a Pen-
nsylvania statute barred from state courts certain actions by per-
sons not licensed by the state as real estate brokers. 2 3 The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, adopting the three-step analysis of
Szantay, held that state law did not prevent unlicensed New York
corporations not doing business in Pennsylvania from maintaining
a cause of action arising outside the state in a Pennsylvania feder-
al court. The court said:
[It is appropriate to bow to state limitations only when
they advance some proper state policy.2 24 It is difficult to
understand what policy could be advanced by conditioning a
New York corporation's access to the federal courts . . . on
a requirement that the corporation register in Pennsyl-
vania when neither the contract nor the conduct of its busi-
ness falls under the control of Pennsylvania authorities. With-
out further justification, it seems to be the kind of blatant
discrimination against citizens of other states that diversity
jurisdiction was meant to avoid.2 25
In Miller v. Davis,2 26 state law withheld from Kentucky courts
jurisdiction to entertain actions concerning trusts situated outside that
state. 2 7 The Sixth Circuit followed Szantay's three steps228 in holding
that state law did not prevent Kentucky beneficiaries from main-
taining a diversity action in Kentucky against trustees of a fund sit-
uated in the District of Columbia and governed by District of Co-
lumbia law. The court found no state policy to inhibit Kentucky bene-
ficiaries' enforcement of their rights against the trustees under the
lex situs, only an eroded policy of promoting uniformity in trust ad-
ministration by confining suits against trustees to the courts of the si-
tus. This was outweighed by identified federal policies, including the
federal interest, embodied in the grant of diversity jurisdiction
itself, in having federal courts entertain actions within the jurisdic-
tional grant when litigants seek a federal forum for the vindication
222. 456 F.2d 857 (3th Cir. 1972).
223. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 446 (1968).
224. Citing Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), and C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 52 at 176 (1st ed. 1963).
225. Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456 F.2d 857, 862 (3rd Cir. 1972). The court
went on to hold that the Pennsylvania statute, correctly interpreted, did not operate to
bar the plaintiff's action. Id.
226. 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974).
227. Wilder v. United Mine Workers Welfare Retirement Fund, 346 S.W.2d 27 (Ky.
1961), which involved the same trust as in Miller v. Davis.
228. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974), eliminating in each step Szau-
tay's reference to constitutional requirements.
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of their rights.229 The Eighth Circuit'.s opinion in Poitra v. Demar-
rias230 falls into this pattern. In Poitra, as in Szantay, state courts
lacked jurisdiction over suits against non-citizens on causes of action
arising in foreign jurisdictions-the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reser-
vation being, in effect, a jurisdiction foreign to North Dakota and its
inhabitants being, in effect, non-citizens.2 3 ' The Court of Appeals as-
certained that jurisdiction was withheld from federal courts by the
federal "consent" statute.2 32 It drew the conclusion that no state po-
licy was at issue in the case. 23 3 The "consent" statute, according
to the court, was "certainly not intended to deprive Indians of state-
created substantive rights. 2 3 4  Entertaining the action would not
conflict with the federal policy of tribal self-government 2s and would
meet the federal courts' supposed "obligation to exercise jurisdic-
tion, when the statutory requisites are satisfied. ' ' 236 Mrs. Poitra could,
therefore, have her wrongful death action heard by a federal court.
Standing against the trend set by Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
are the two Ninth Circuit decisions mentioned earlier,23 7 Littell v. Na-
kai23. and Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hail.2 39 In each, the court determined
that an action by a non-Indian against a member of the Navajo
229. Id. at 316-17. The court also identified relevant federal interests in the uniform
application of venue statutes and the equitable administration of trust funds with multi-
state operations, whose beneficiaries in states without "door-closing" statutes could sue
trustees in local federal courts. Id. at 317-18. Similar to Miller v. Davis is Poe v. Mar-
quette Cement Manufacturing Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Md. 1974), where an Illinois
corporation was being sued in a Maryland federal court by shareholders dissenting from
approval of a merger. They sought to recover the fair value of their shares under Illinois
law. Applying the Szantzay three-step analysis, the court held that if Maryland law's
"internal affairs" doctrine withheld Jurisdiction over the action from state courts on the
ground that the action involved the affairs of a foreign corporation, diversity jurisdiction
was not withheld from the federal court. The state rule was attributable to the limited
powers of state courts to enforce judgments against foreign corporations. The liberal fed-
eral procedures for transfer of actions, multi-district litigation and enforcement of judg.
ments, which contributed to a "unified" federal judicial system, were deemed "affirma.
tiv countervailing federal considerations" weighing in favor of the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. Id. at 1058.
230. 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975).
231. Inhabitants of the North Dakota portion of the reservation are, in law, citizens of
North Dakota. Note 5 supra. But not having consented to state jurisdiction, they are not
subject to the civil laws of the state. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
232. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
233. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1974). Had the court considered the
state "consent" statute, N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-19 (1974), it could have found that state
policy was merely to recede from a field outside state responsibilities, not to take from
Indians the benefits and liabilities arising under the state wrongful death, statute, N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 32-21 (1960). Alternatively, it could have found that the substantive
rights 'and obligations on which Mrs. Poitra's action was founded arose under the laws
of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, not the laws of North Dakota. The tribal code pro-
vided that, 'Where appropriate, the laws of the state were the reservation is located may
be employed to determine civil matters." Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Code of Justice §
2.1 (July 1973). Either determination could have led to the conclusion that the state
"consent" statute was not "bound up" with the rights and obligations asserted by the
plaintiff and, therefore, need not apply to federal courts, See text accompanying notes
204-0$ supra.
234. Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27 (8th Cir. 1974).
235. Id. at 29.
236. Id. at 27.
237. See text accompanying notes 40-9, 71-4, 125-27 supra.
238. 844 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
239. 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Tribe fell under the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Lee.240
Williams prohibited, in the absence of congressional authorization,
exercises of state jurisdiction which would infringe upon the right
of Indians to govern themselves in reservation affairs.24 1 For this rea-
son, the Arizona courts in which Littell and Hot Oil were filed lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the actions. With little more than a
citation to Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 242 the Ninth Circuit held
that becuase state courts lacked jurisdiction, federal courts lacked
diversity jurisdiction.243 Szantay and Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec-
tric Cooperative244 were not considered.
VII. POLICIES WHICH MIGHT CLOSE THE FEDERAL COURTS
The two Ninth Circuit cases and Poitra v. Demarrias differ in an
important respect from cases in which the Szantay approach to state
"door-closing" laws has been adopted. In the former, but not the lat-
ter, a decision to entertain the action must create serious discrimina-
tion among citizens of a state. Unlike the discrimination which con-
cerned the Supreme Court in Erie-discrimination against residents
of the forum state in favor of non-residents 2 5-it is not produced by
the statutory provisions for removal of actions and it bears upon re-
sident plaintiffs as well as resident defendants. 2 4 6 If state courts are
open equally to citizens and non-citizens, 247 as is usually the case,
the effect of diversity of citizenship is no more than to provide, by
choice or compulsion, the alternative of a federal forum to persons
who have access to a state forum. If state courts are closed to non-
citizens but open to citizens, the effect of diversity of citizenship is
to make available to non-citizens what citizens already have: access
to some court located within the state.2 48 In either situation, the rela-
tive (dis)advantage of parties to non-diverse litigation is slight, and
in the latter the overall effect is to neutralize discrimination effect-
ed by state law.2 41 If, however, state courts are closed to both citizens
240. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
241. Id. at 223.
242. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
243. Littell v. Nakal, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965); Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall,
866 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1966). Curiously, Littell v. Nakal was not cited in Hot Oil.
244. 356 U.S. 525 (1958), reh. denied, 357 U.S. 933 (1958).
245. See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
246. Ely, The Irrepressible My/th of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 712 n.112 (1974).
247. This description includes cases in which citizens of a state have access to courts of
other states but not their own. See Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 110 F.2d
401 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. granted, 310 U.S. 623 (1940), dismissed, 311 U.S. 720 (1940)
Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974); Poe v. Marquette Cement Manufacturing
Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Md. 1974).
248. See Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1948), reh., 170 F.2d 694
(5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 837 U.S. 535 (1949) ; Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60
(4th Cir. 1965) ; Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456 F.2d 857 (3rd Cir. 1972).
249. Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: Re-examining Woods v. interstate Realty Co.
and Reopening the Federal Courts, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 56, 66-7 (1969) ; see Szantay v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Sun Sales Corp. v. Block Land, Inc., 456
F.2d 857, 862 (3rd Cir. 1972).
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and non-citizens, the relative (dis) advantage of parties to non-diverse
causes of action is very great if federal courts exercise diversity
jurisdiction over similar causes of action. Residents fortunate enough
to have been wronged by a non-resident have a legal remedy; those
similarly wronged, but by a co-resident, do not. Residents with the
misfortune of having wronged a non-resident can incur liability;
others cannot.
This form of discrimination was not scrutinized in Erie, Littell,
Hot Oil Service, Inc. or Pcitra. The Court of Appeals panel which
heard Poitra must have been aware of it. On the same day as its
Poitra decision, it held in another case that there was no federal-
question jurisdiction over tort actions by non-Indians against tri-
bal Indians for injuries suffered in an automobile accident on the
Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation. 25 0 Diversity of citizenship
was not present, state courts lacked jurisdiction, as in Poitra,2 5 1 and
the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over most claims by non-Indians,
including this one. 252 The plaintiffs, therefore, were left without any
judicial remedy. 25 3 Mrs. Poitra, on the other hand, was given an en-
tree to the federal courts because her adversary was a South Dakotan.
As an Indian, she was alslo entitled to bring her action before the
tribal court.
25
Avoidance of discrimination among co-citizens, although not ad-
dressed by Erie, is worth of consideration as an "Erie policy" and
weighs on the side of applying to federal courts laws closing the doors
of state courts. It is, nevertheless, a, policy of insufficient strength
250. Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (Sth Cir. 1974).
251. Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975).
252. The tribal court had jurisdiction over a civil action instituted by a non-Indian only
if he had been resident or doing business on the reservation for at least one year and
the amount in controversy did not exceed $300. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Code of Jus-
tice § 1.2(c) (2) (July 1973).
253. Tribal codes which exclude claims by non-Indians against Indians from tribal courts
but permit tribal courts to hear similar claims by Indians against other Indians may vio-
late the "due process" and "equal protection" provisions of the "Indian Bill of Rights,"
25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970). Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973
UTAH L. REv. 206, 220 n.107. The court disposed of this issue on procedural grounds in
Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 70 (8th Cir. 1974).
254. The tribal court had jurisdiction over all civil matters where all parties were "In-
dians within the jurisdiction of the Court." Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Code of Justice §
1.2(c) (1) (July 1973). However, had Mrs. Poitra pursued her claim in the tribal court,
she would have run the risks that the court would apply tribal law instead of state law,
Id. § 2.1, quoted at note 259 infra, and that its judgment would not be recognized for pur-
poses of obtaining payment from the North Dakota Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. Note, 63
GEo. L.J. 989, 997 n.53 (1975); see Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation,
1973 UTAH L. REv. 206, 227 n.149. But see Schantz v. White Lightning,"502 F.2d 67, 70
n.4 (8th Cir. 1974). Motivated by its interest in enabling members of the tribe to enjoy
the benefits of the fund, the tribe filed anticus curiae briefs in the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court favoring the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the action. Tribal law
required that motor vehicles driven on the reservation comply with state automobile regis-
tration laws. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Code of Justice § 8.3 (July 1973). One dollar of
the annual registration fee in North Dakota was paid to the state unsatisfied judgment
fund. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01, 39-17-02 (1972). The fund was open to any resident
of the state who obtained an unsatisfied judgment exceeding $300 for personal injuries
or death in "any court in this state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-17-03 (1972). It is uncertain
whether the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court is included within the term "any court in
this state."
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to close federal courts to diversity actions. When citizens of a state
have decided to exclude certain actions from their courts, it is not
unjust to hold them to their decision inter se while not applying it to
non-citizens, who had no voice in the decision-making process. Any
discrimination is of the citizens' own making. An non-citizen wronged
by a citizen ought not be denied a remedy if closing the federal
courts does not give effect to an identifiable state policy on a mat-
ter within state powers. The non-citizen wrongdoer's complaint of
the advantage enjoyed by his victim vis-a-vis citizens wronged by co-
citizens should not prevail. All persons, citizens and non-citizens, have
the obligation to avoid conduct which is wrongful under state law,
whether or not a person injured by that conduct would have a remedy.
The differential treatment of diverse and non-diverse litigation under
these circumstances does not give contradictory or uncertain in-
structions for planning primary conduct. 25 5 That some persons injured
by wrongful conduct cannot receive redress, for want of a court in
which a claim can be heard, is not a sufficient reason to deny redress
to other persons, similarly injured, whose claims meet the statutory
requirements of diversity jurisdiction.
The same analysis applies when federal law closes the doors of
state courts to litigation against tribal Indians. 2 6 The doors open if
a state assumes jurisdiction with tribal consent. 257 If the mem-
bers of a tribe have not given their consent, it is not unjust to hold
them to their decision inter se, while not applying it in diversity ac-
tions to non-members, who had no voice in the decision-making pro-
cess. Any distinction between intra-tribal causes of action and other
255. "[D]ebilating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs," produced by "two
conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens," concerned, Justice
Harlan in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Pro-
fessor H. M. Hart once observed that "People repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov's dogs, to
two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies,
could not fail in the end to react as the dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a
nervous breakdown." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 490 (1954). Poitra v. Demarrias is unlikely to cause any nervous breakdowns.
Opening the federal courts to actions over which state courts lack Jurisdiction does not
produce a situation In which a person who cannot predict or control where he will be sued
will lose in federal court if he does X and lose in state court if he does not. At most, it
produces a situation in which a person must do X in order to ensure that he will not lose
In either court. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 698, 710-12
(1974).
256. In the absence of federal enabling legislation, states have no authority to Interfere
with Indian tribal self-government. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ; McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 168-73 (1973). The federal "consent"
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970), is an example of such enabling legislation, as was
Its predecessor, which permitted states to assume Jurisdiction over reservations without
Indian consent. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 590, repealed by the Act of
April 11, 1968, tit. IV, § 403(b), 82 Stat. 79. But an effect of the "consent" statute is
to prohibit states from exercising jurisdiction if the Indians concerned have not consented
to state Jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970), even if the
state would not be interfering with tribal self-government. See Kennerly v. District Court
of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973) Demarrias v. Poitra, 421 U.S. 934
(1975) (White, J., dissenting).
257. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
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claims is of the tribe's own making. Opening the federal courts to di-
versity actions arising on reservations neutralizes the discrimination
between actions by non-Indians against tribal Indians, which other-
wise would be heard only by tribal courts or not heard at all, and ac-
tions by Indians against non-Indians, which can be heard by state
courts1 8 and by federal courts in the exercise of diversity jurisdic-
tion. If conduct is wrongful under the applicable substantive law, be
it federal, state or tribal, '259 a person injured by it whose claim fails
under the statutory powers of a federal district court should not lack
a remedy solely because other persons, similarly situated but with-
out diversity of citizenship, have no remedy. It can be 'argued that, in
the absence of a claim based on federal law, the federal govern-
ment has no more interest than a state in the adjudication of an ac-
tion arising on a reservation; therefore, a federal court should not
hear an action over which state courts lack jurisdiction. 260 Still, the
federal government could have no less interest in the adjudication of
diversity actions against Indians than in the adjudication of diver-
sity actions against non-Indians. A distinction between the two, based
on degree of federal interest, is not warranted. If it is accepted that
the state courts' want of jurisdiction does not prevent federal courts
from entertaining reservation-based diversity actions by non-Indians
against tribal Indians, it should also be accepted that the state courts'
want of jurisdiction does not exclude similar actions brought by In-
dians against other Indians, such as Poitra. The federal interest in the
adjudication of claims of Indians against other Indians is substan-
tial. 26 1 A distinction between actions among Indians and actions involv-
ing non-Indians is not justified by the Indians' participation in deci-
sions about the jurisdiction of state and tribal courts. The effect of
a "door-closing" law in force in the state to which one party belongs
does not depend upon whether a "door-closing" law is in force in
the state to which a opposite party belongs. No weight, therefore,
should be given to the circumstance that under the federal "consent"
258. Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317 (1952); McCrea v. Busch, - Mont.
1 524 P.2d 781 (1974); Palz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966); Rolette
County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645, 648 (N.D. 1974). See McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973) ; Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Res-
ervation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 206, 221.
259. Many tribal codes provide for the application of state law to proceedings in tribal
courts. Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAir L. Rzv. 206. 216-18,
and tribal codes cited therein. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Code of Justice § 2.1 (July 1973)
provides: "Civil matters shall be governed by the laws, customs and usages of the Tribe
not prohibited by the laws of the United States. . . . The laws of the state where the
reservation is located may be employed as a guide. . . . Where appropriate, the laws of
the state where the reservation is located may be employed to determine civil matters."
260. Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALiF. L. REv. 445, 480-81
(1970).
261. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973), reflects
the view that states have no interest in the resolution of reservation-based claims unless
there Is a non-Indian party. It does not follow that the federal government has no Interest
in the resolution of reservation-based claims unless there is a non-Indian party. See notes
270-76 infra and accompanying text.
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statute, a similar action against the plaintiff could not be heard in
the courts of his state.
Given the task of weighing policies favoring the exercise of diver-
sity jurisdiction against policies favoring conformity to laws closing
state courts, federal courts can properly decide to close their doors
to reservation-based actions against Indians only if doing so gives
effect to an identifiable federal policy relating to the governance of
reservation Indians. Only a pervasive federal policy of avoiding fed-
eral interference with Indian self-government could justify the blan-
ket exclusion of such actions from federal courts. Legislative inter-
ference with tribal government has been restrained. 262 The legislative
and executive branches of the federal government have embraced a
policy of favoring Indian self-determination and strengthening tribal
governments. 2 3 Federal adjudication of actions against Indians has
the same effect upon tribal authority as does state adjudication: an
external power ousts the tribe as exclusive arbiter of reservation-
based claims. 26 4 The Eighth Circuit in Poitra v. Demarrias265 erred
in failing to recognize the interference with tribal self-government
accomplished by the exercise of federal jurisdiction over private
tort and contract claims. 266 If adjudication in Williams v. Lee 267 of an
action to recover the- price of goods sold on credit would "undermine
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs, and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves,
'2
.
so would adjudication in Poitra of a tort claim arising from an auto-
mobile accident. 20s But to conclude that federal adjudication and
262. E.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1970); "Indian Bill of Rights,"
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
263. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 450, 450a
(Supp. 1976); S. Con. Res. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 Cong. Rec. 46383 (1971) (passed
Senate, Dec. 11, 1971; did not pass House); R. Rpt. No. 93-1600, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) ; President Lyndon Johnson, Message on the American Indian-The Forgotten
American, H.R. Doc. No. 272, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 Cong. Rec. 5394, 5517 (1968) ;
President Richard Nixon, Message on American Indians, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 23131, 23258 (1970); President Richard Nixon, Special Intro-
duction to Symposium on Indian Law, 48 N.D. L. Rev. 529 (1972).
264. Note, 63 GEO. L.J. 989, 999 (1975), criticizing Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 29
(8th Cir. 1974) ; see Littell v. Nakal, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965).
265. 502 F.2d 23, 28-9 (8th Cir. 1974).
266. Littell v. Nakat, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966),
and Hot Oil Service Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966), (see text accompanying
notes 40-9, 237-44 supra) were distinguished on the ground that their facts put "the non-
Interference and tribal self-government policies from Williams [v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959)] . . . in issue" so that "the refusal by the courts to accept jurisdiction seems cor-
rect . Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 29 (8th Cir. 1974). In Littell v. Nakai, the
plaintiff complained of the tribal chairman's alleged tortious interference with the per-
formance of the plaintiff's contract with the tribe. Hot Oil involved an agreement for the
lease of facilities on tribal land.
267. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
268. Id. at 223.
269. Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812, 814-15 (N.D. 1975): see Littell v.
Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1965). Under Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),
state courts lacked Jurisdiction over actions against Indians for torts occurring on reserva-
tions. Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886 (1969) (Indian plaintiff; auto-
mobile accident); Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961) (same) Smith
v. Temple, 82 S.D. 650, 152 N.W.2d 547 (1967) (same) ; Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 161
N.W.2d 704 (1968) (non-Indian plaintiff; wrongful possession and use of land) ;
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state adjudication are "equally disruptive of [federal] policy," as
the Ninth Circuit did in Littell v. Nakai,210 assumes the existence of
a policy against federal interference with tribal government corre-
lative to the judicially recognized policy against state interference,
'2 7 1
which is furthered by the federal "consent" statute.27 2 This assump-
tion fails to note that the Supreme Court's protection of tribal sover-
eignty 27 3 and Congress' enactment of the "consent" statute reflect
only a purpose to control state interference.2 7 4 Moreover, it ignores
the substantial and long-existing differences between the relationship
of Indians to the national government and the relationship of In-
dians to the states. 27 5 The extent of federal control over tribal govern-
ments, particularly the breadth of powers residing in the Secre-
tary of the Interior,'2 7 6 belies the establishment of a policy against
federal interference complimentary to the policy against state in-
terference. In the absence of a federal policy which could outweigh
policies favoring the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, the Eighth
Circuit was correct to hold in Poitra v. Demarrias that 25 U.S.C. §
1322 (a) did not, by preventing the exercise of state jurisdiction over
the action, prevent the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny do not require a fed-
Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975) (non-Indian plaintiffs; auto-
mobile accident). See Ransom & Gilstrap, Indians-Civil Jurisdiction in New Mexico-State,
Federal and Tribal Courts, 1 N.M. L. REv. 196, 207-11 (1971). In McClanahan v. State
Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1973), the Supreme Court implied that
a state cannot assume Jurisdiction over a reservation-based action to which only Indians
are parties, even without infringing upon Indians' rights to self-government, because the
state has no interest in the resolution of the claim.
270. Littel v. Nakai, 844 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965). Note, 63 GEo. L.J. 989, 099-1000
(1975), agrees.
271. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) ; McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of
Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 168-70 (1973).
272. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) ; Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23. 27-9 (8th Cir. 1974).
273. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) ; United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886) ; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) ; McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
274. Poltra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 27-9 (8th Cir. 1974). See McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973): "[Tlhe trend has been away from the
idea of Inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal pre-emption. . . . The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions
of Indian sovreignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which de-
fine the limits of state power," (emphasis added). The Court's holding in Kennerly v. Dis-
trict Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), that tribal con-
sent to state jurisdiction is ineffective unless given in the manner prescribed -by 25 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (1970) reflects a weak regard for tribal self-determination. See id. at 431-32
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
275. See generally Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CAL F. L.
REV. 445 (1970) ; Green, North America's Indians and the Trusteeship Concept, 4 AxNGo-
AM. L. REv. 137 (1975).
276. M. PRicE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 717-30 (1963). These powers include
"management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations"
through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) ; the issuance of char-
ters of Incorporation to tribes, 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970) ; approval of contracts made by
tribes, 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1970) ; the employment and compensation of legal counsel, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 81, 476, 1331 (1970) ; leases of tribal lands, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (SuPp. III 1973) ; and tribal
constitutions, bylaws and amendments thereto. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
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eral district court to refrain from adjudicating an action whenever
state or federal law withholds jurisdiction over the action from the
courts of its state. The court may decline to apply to itself "door-
closing" laws prevailing in state courts if this does not frustrate an
identifiable state policy on a matter of state concern. A state or
federal law denying to state courts jurisdiction over reservation-based
actions against tribal Indians is based upon the very absence of state
concern. State policy, therefore, cannot be frustrated by the exer-
cise of diversity jurisdiction. Neither is federal policy frustrated, for
the federal desire to strengthen tribal self-government and foster
Indian self-determination does not extend so far as to conflict with
federal-court resolution of civil claims against Indians. Even though
the result is to create discrimination between parties to diverse
claims and parties to non-diverse claims, federal courts are obliged to
entertain actions against tribal Indians arising on a reservation
when they fall within the grant of diversity jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (a).

